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VK2AAB > FUEL     18.05.10 08:03l 399 Lines 23959 Bytes #999 (0) @ WW
BID : 7599_VK2AAB
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Subj: CHINA's Coal Demand & Peak Coal
Path: DB0FHN<DB0MRW<DB0ERF<OK0NHD<SR1BSZ<OK4PEN<IW0QNL<IR2UBX<IK2XDE<DB0RES<
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Sent: 100512/0608Z @:VK2AAB.#SYD.NSW.AUS.OC #:7599 [SYDNEY] FBB7.00i $:7599_VK2
From: VK2AAB@VK2AAB.#SYD.NSW.AUS.OC
To  : FUEL@WW

Hello All,
There is much talk of China's  expotential growth but the upshot is the world
does  not  have  enough  resourses to  enable  that  to  happen.  This  means
ultimately that most of China's population will always be poor.

This  article by  Richard Heinberg  shows why  coal must  get  expensive  and
prevent the sequestration of CO2 fom power stations.

73 Barry VK2AAB
-----------------------------------------------------

China's coal bubble...and how it will deflate U.S. efforts to develop "clean 
coal"

Posted by Gail the Actuary on May 11, 2010 - 10:37am
Topic: Supply/Production
Tags: chinese coal consumption, coal, coal production [list all tags]

This is a guest post by Richard Heinberg. The post was originally published by 
the Post Carbon Institute.

The conventional wisdom in energy-and-environment circles is that China's 
economy, which is growing at a rate of eight percent or more per year, is 
mostly coal powered today and will continue to be so for decades to come. Coal 
is cheap and abundant, and China uses far more of it than any other nation. 
The country is trying to develop other energy sources fastincluding nuclear, 
solar, and windbut these won't be sufficient to reduce its reliance on coal. 
That's one of the reasons it is important for the U.S. to develop "clean coal" 
technology, which China can then begin to adopt so as to reduce the horrific 
climate impacts of its coal-heavy energy mix.

Most of this conventional wisdom is correct, but some of it is plain wrongso 
wrong, in fact, that environment-, economic-, and energy-policy wonks are 
constructing scenarios for the future of U.S. and world energy, and for the 
global economy, that bear little or no resemblance to the reality that is 
unfolding.

Let's see if we can sort what's right from what's not, and see also if doing 
so can help us paint a more accurate picture of where China, and the rest of 
the world, are actually headed.
Runaway Train

It is true of course that China's coal consumption is enormous and growing, 
and that coal is the basis of the Chinese economy, fueling over 80 percent of 
electricity generation. China's coal output grew an astonishing 28.1 percent 
from first quarter 2009 to first quarter 2010, to over 750 million metric tons 
consumed in just the past three months. But this is a situation that is 
patently unsustainablenot just because of the carbon emissions it entails, but 
because China simply doesn't have enough coal to continue growing its 
consumption much longer.

Start with the stats and do some simple math. China is now mining and burning 
over three billion tons of coal per year. If the nation's coal consumption 
grows at, say, seven percent per year, that means consumption will double in 
ten years (its annual growth rate was actually over nine percent in one or two 
of the last several years, implying a doubling every eight yearsbut let's be 
conservative and assume seven percent growth). In that case, by 2020 China 
would be using about six billion tons per annum.

It takes some reflection to come to terms with the enormity of these figures. 
In 2000, China's coal consumption was only marginally higher than that of the 
U.S. Today, a decade later, it is three times U.S. consumption. (It is worth 
noting that the U.S. has double China's coal reserves.)

Combine unprecedented consumption levels with furious growth rates and you 
quickly arrive at absurdities and impossibilities. As in, it won't happen. The 
wheels will fall off the wagon first.
There Are Limits

It takes infrastructure to mine and use coal. Rails and rail wagons, plus 
trucks and roads, are needed to move coal from mines to power plants. Then 
there are the mines themselves, as well as the boilers and turbines that 
actually produce electricity. (In this essay we will not further consider the 
vital importance of coal to China's steel industry, and the necessity of steel 
for manufacturing and economic growth in general.)

China is building all of these at a frenetic pacebut the relentless math of 
exponential growth is starting to hit home. Doubling small levels of 
production and consumption is relatively easy in practical terms, but, as 
quantities expand, the task balloons. China accomplished an amazing feat by 
adding almost two billion tons per year of coal production and consumption 
capacity and transport infrastructure during the past decade. Adding another 
three billion tons per year of capacity during the next decade would bewell, 
nearly twice as big a feat. Imagine building mining and transport 
infrastructure three times the size of the entire U.S. coal and rail 
industries in just ten years. That's what it will take for China to maintain 
seven percent growth rates.

It takes other resources to consume coal; crucially, water is needed to run 
coal power plants. A typical 500-megawatt coal-fired power plant uses about 
2.2 billion gallons of water each year to create steam for turning its 
turbinesenough water to support a city of 250,000 people. In recent months 
droughts have wracked huge sections of China, idling hydroelectric dams and 
stoking demand for coal. If the droughts recur and worsen (as climate-change 
scenarios suggest), at some point nuclear and coal power plants will be forced 
to shut down as well, leading to the kinds of electricity supply problems that 
are already plaguing Pakistan and dozens of other nations, where the lights 
are off for hours each day even in the largest cities.

And so, partly due to these factors, but primarily because most of the 
highways, shopping malls, and appliances that the Chinese people are likely to 
need for a while have by now already been built, China is entering a period 
characterized by what are called "saturation effects," which will result in 
significant slowdowns in key industrial energy consuming sectors of the 
economy. China's infrastructure boom that has driven so much of energy demand 
growth in the past decade has probably peaked, so that growth in cement and 
steel demand will soon taper off. While the nation's stimulus package, 
representing 40 percent of GDP, has extended the party, it will play out over 
the next year or so and probably can't be repeated.

But that still leaves a smoldering question: can China's coal industry 
continue to supply domestic demand with even modest rates of growth going 
forward, declining perhaps to something more on the order of two percent per 
year?
If It's Not There, You Can't Burn It

According to the World Coal Institute, China has reserves totaling a little 
over 110 billion tons. That's almost 37 years' worth of coal at current rates 
of consumption (i.e., three billion tons per year). But to assume that China 
won't have coal supply problems until 37 years have passed is also to assume 
two absurdities: that Chinese demand, production, and consumption of coal will 
remain constant; and that after maintaining this steady rate of extraction and 
consumption for 37 years, China will one day suddenly discover that its coal 
has run out.

In the real world, China's demand for coal is expected to grow. Adding ten 
percent annual consumption growth to the forecast would yield a reserves 
lifetime of only 16 years. While a sustained rate of growth this high is 
extremely unlikely, the principle is worth keeping in mind.

Also in the real world, production profiles plotted over time assume the shape 
of a distorted bell curve that starts at zero and ends at zero, with a peak 
somewhere in between. We know this is true for coal extraction because several 
regions in the world have already seen a peak and substantial decline of 
extraction rates, while no region has so far managed to maintain a high, 
steady rate of production (or a growing rate of production) until reserves 
suddenly reached exhaustion. This means that China's coal production will peak 
and begin to decline significantly sooner than reserves-to-production ratios 
(37 at steady rates, or 16 with ten percent annual growth) would suggest.

Could China increase its coal reserves? In principle, yes. Reserves are 
defined as the portion of the total coal resource base that geologists believe 
can be mined economically. New mining technology and higher coal prices could 
impact those estimates. However, the overwhelming trend globally is for 
reserves to be downgraded to mere resources as geologists take into account 
more restrictions on the amount of coal that is practically 
recoverablerestrictions like location, depth, seam thickness, and coal 
quality. It is this general trend that causes some analysts to doubt China's 
official reserves figure of 187 billion tons (which is notably higher than 
estimates published by World Energy Council, World Coal Institute, and 
others): the coal is certainly there, butlike the great majority of coal 
elsewhere in the worldmost of it is probably destined to stay right where it 
is.

In my 2009 book Blackout: Coal, Climate and the Last Energy Crisis, I surveyed 
four studies forecasting the timing of the peak of China's coal production. At 
one extreme, a 2006 study by Energy Watch Group of Germany used a reserves 
figure of 62.2 billion tons to forecast a peak of production for 2015, with a 
rapid production decline commencing in 2020. At the other extreme was a 2007 
study by Chinese academics Tao and Li published in Energy Policy, which used 
the Chinese government's official coal reserves figure of 187 billion tons to 
arrive at a peaking date between 2025 and 2032.

None of these forecasts envisioned the rapid growth in Chinese coal production 
that has actually occurred over the past few years. This predictive failure 
could be interpreted in one of two ways: it suggests either that China's coal 
reserves are larger than previously estimated, thus permitting a higher 
sustained rate of extraction; or that Chinese officials have forced extraction 
rates to the absolute maximum level sooner rather than later in order to 
support economic growth, thus hastening the production peakwhich could 
therefore possibly occur even before the earliest forecast date (2015).
No Alternatives

Economic growth requires energy, and China needs economic growth to maintain 
domestic political stability and international competitiveness. If there's not 
enough coal to support the nation's energy growth, then other options must be 
considered.

China is developing alternative energy sources; can these be brought on line 
fast enough to make a difference? Let's do some numbers. China aims to have 
100 gigawatts (GW) of wind power capacity by 2020, and the nation's leaders 
plan to expand installed solar capacity to 20 GW during the same period. These 
are truly astonishing goals, and, if China even comes close to accomplishing 
them, it will become the world's renewable energy leader. But there is a 
problem: total Chinese electricity generation capacity is 900 GW currently; 
with seven percent growth, that means the nation's electricity demand in 2020 
will be something like 1800 GW. Wind and solar together would supply less than 
seven percent of that. The only thing likely to boost that percentage much 
would be a dramatic reduction in growth of energy demand to, say, two percent 
annually.

The situation with nuclear power is similar: China has 11 atomic power plants 
now and is in the process of building 20 more, with a target of 60 GW of 
generating capacity, or possibly more, by 2020. But this will supply only 
between three and five percent of total electricity demand, depending on 
energy demand growth rates.

The conclusion is unsettling but inescapable: China's reliance on coal cannot 
be significantly reduced as long as its demand for electrical power continues 
to grow at anything like current rates. And even if energy demand growth 
tapers off and alternative energy sources come on line quickly, the country's 
ability to supply enough coal domestically will still be challenged.
Imports Can't Make Up the Difference

China has been self-sufficient in coal until recently (importing some coal but 
exporting just as much or more), but supply problems over the last couple of 
years have led to burgeoning imports and shrinking exports. If Chinese coal 
mines can no longer cover the nation's demand, why not just expand imports 
still further to make up the difference?

China will import 150 million tons (Mt) of coal this year, twice what it 
imported last year. That's not much, if we think of it as a percentage of the 
nation's total coal consumption. But that 150 Mt represents over 60 percent of 
the total exports of Australia, the world's top coal exporter. This means if 
Chinese imports double again next yearnot an unrealistic scenarioChina will 
need to import more coal than Australia can currently provide. One more 
doubling of import demand and China will be wanting to import 600 million tons 
per year, about the total amount of coal exported by all exporting nations 
last year.

Can Australia expand its coal production? Yes, it can and no doubt will. 
Likewise Indonesia and South Africa. But will any or all of these countries be 
able to grow exports fast enough to keep up with Chinese demand? Again, 
expansion will be limited by infrastructure requirementsships, ports, trains, 
and rails. It takes time to build all of these. By the latter decades of the 
21st century, Australia could be the world's biggest coal producer, even 
though that nation's coal reserves are smaller than those of the U.S., China, 
or India. (How can this be? It would simply occur as a result of the latter 
high-consuming nations gobbling up their own reserves so quickly and so soon; 
Australia has been a fairly minor producer up to this point.) But that will do 
China little good over the next decade or so, if its domestic coal production 
peaks and goes into steep decline.

China's increasing reliance on coal imports is not good news for India, 
Europe, and other coal importers. India burns 500 Mt of coal per year and is 
facing growing problems with its domestic mining industry. The solution 
appears to be, unsurprisingly, to import more coal. India wants to grow its 
economy at seven percent annually, just as the Chinese are doing, and India's 
economy is just as coal-dependent as China's.

Until recently, coal has been a resource used mostly in the country of origin. 
Internationally traded coal was a fairly small percentage of the total amount 
consumed globallya situation quite different from that with oil, over half of 
which is exported from the country of origin. However, there is an increasing 
trend toward the development of an integrated global coal marketand it appears 
that trend is about to go into overdrive.

This means that if Chinese and Indian demand for coal imports pushes up the 
price for export coal (as it almost certainly will, and probably quite 
dramatically), the result will be higher coal prices everywhereeven within 
nations that are self-sufficient in the resource. After all, if a coal mining 
company in the U.S. can get twice the price for its product by selling it 
abroad as opposed to selling it domestically, won't it opt to export? Unless 
governments implement export curbs or domestic price caps, the international 
export price of coal will end up being the domestic price for countries 
everywhere.

Yet if coal prices go too high, that will cause demand to fall, as potential 
coal buyers choose other energy sources or simply do without. The result will 
be the same kind of volatility in coal prices as we have seen in oil prices 
over the past few years. That price volatility will undermine energy markets 
in general, and poorer nations that use coal will consistently be outbid.
Implication for the U.S.: Forget "Clean Coal"

Now: what does any of this have to do with "clean coal" technology?

Also known as Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS), "clean coal" is touted 
as the solution to one of the biggest conundrums facing industrial 
civilization in the 21st century: how to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
thus prevent catastrophic climate change, while maintaining growth in energy 
supplies and therefore in economic activity. Since nobody in a position of 
authority can seemingly figure out how to maintain economic growth while 
cutting coal out of the energy equation globally, and since nearly everyone 
assumes coal will remain cheap and abundant far into the foreseeable future, 
the obvious answer to the dilemma is to find a way to continue burning 
increasing amounts of coal while keeping the resulting CO2 from going into the 
atmosphere.

We know this can be doneon a small scale. All of the elements of the 
technology are already working in various pilot projects. Oil companies 
already inject carbon dioxide into oil wells to increase production. 
Pipelines, compressors, pumpsnone of these requires quantum physics.

There are two hitches: the difficulty of scaling up such an enterprise, and 
its impact on electricity prices. As many analysts have pointed out, the sheer 
size of the proposed operationif deployed nationally in the U.S. alone, let 
alone the entire worldwill be mind-boggling. And the costs of all those 
pipelines, pumps, compressors, and new coal gasification power plants (these 
are needed because it's really difficult and expensive to add CCS onto 
existing pulverized coal burning power plants) add up quickly and steeply. 
Every energy analyst agrees that this will boost the cost of electricity.

Still, the scheme might just barely workas long as coal prices remain 
constant.

However, add much higher coal prices to the equation and the result is 
electricity costs that will significantly dampen economic growth, make other 
energy sources comparatively more economically viableor both. Conclusion: 
"clean coal" is an idea whose time will never come.

Now, there are other reasons for assuming that U.S. coal prices will be higher 
in a decade or so than they are now. Official estimates of U.S. coal reserves 
are probably inflated, and domestic supply problems could start to appear 
sooner than most energy analysts are willing to admit. Moreover, America's 
coal transport infrastructure could be hobbled by higher diesel prices if 
world oil production goes into decline soon (as increasing numbers of analysts 
foresee), since transport costs often account for the lion's share of the 
delivered price of coal. But even if we ignore those looming systemic limits 
and consider only the implications of China's growing demand for coal imports, 
it's clear that U.S. coal prices can go nowhere but up. The only thing likely 
to keep them from doing so would be a collapse of the Chineseand the 
globaleconomy.
China: Leading the Global EconomyInto the Ditch

Some commentators are concerned about China's economy for reasons that have 
nothing to do with coal. The prime example: it would appear that Beijing has a 
problem with over-reliance on property development as an engine of domestic 
economic growth. One of those sounding the alarm on this score is hedge fund 
manager James Chanos, founder of Kynikos Associates Ltd.; he says China is "on 
a treadmill to hell," and that the nation is "Dubai times a thousand." He has 
also been quoted as saying, "They can't afford to get off this heroin of 
property development. It is the only thing keeping the economic . . . numbers 
growing."

A bursting of China's property bubble could collapse the nation's economy 
quickly and soon. But it is essentially a problem of money, and money is a 
creation of the human mind. Currencies can be reformed; banking systems can be 
reorganized. Such things are painful and take time, but they are certainly 
possibleand historic examples are numerous.

Energy is different. Without energy, nothing happens. Transport systems stall; 
building construction and manufacturing cease. The lights go out. You can't 
make energy out of nothing and you can't call it into existence with computer 
keystrokes, as bankers can do with money. Generating electrical power requires 
physical resources, infrastructure, and labor. And so there are natural limits 
to how much energy we can summon for our human purposes at any given time.

China has become a great manufacturing powerhouse largely because it was able 
to grow its energy supply quickly and cheaply. And so China's contribution to 
the world economy is to this extent a function of China's contribution to 
world energy. One significant gauge of this link is the fact that Chinese coal 
production represents more than double the amount of energy contributed to the 
world economy as compared to Saudi Arabia's oil production (1,100 million tons 
of oil equivalent vs. 540 Mtoe.)

If China faces hard energy limits, that means its economy is living on 
borrowed time. That also means the world as a whole confronts energy and 
economic constraints that are harsher, and closer, than we are being told.
Forever Blowing Bubbles?

High coal prices and "clean coal" don't mix. China's insatiable hunger for 
more coal will drive up coal prices everywhere. China can't keep up coal-
powered industrial expansion for much longer, nor can the global economy 
accelerate without the engine of China. The evidence on these scores couldn't 
be clearer: the numbers we have discussed are fairly uncontroversial, and the 
math of compounded steady growth is easy. Still, none of these realities has 
entered our public discourse. This fact in itself is really peculiar and 
disturbing. We are participating in a slow-motion train wreck, yet all we can 
manage to discuss is the quality of the food in the dining car.

Maybe this is because acknowledging the train wreck would require us to 
confront a slew of contradictions at the core of the entire modern industrial 
project. Without clean coal, there is no solution to the climate crisisunless 
we are willing to contemplate giving up economic growth. But further growth 
may be unattainable anyway, as the world approaches fundamental resource 
limits. Nobody wants to think about these things, much less talk about them. 
Not China's leaders, nor economists elsewhere, nor many environmentalists, nor 
politicians, nor journalists.

But we can't wish these limits away. Impossible things (like unending economic 
growth) won't happen just because people want them to. And awful things (like 
the wreck of the China train) won't be averted just because acknowledging them 
makes us uncomfortable.

There are of course steps that Chinese officialseveryone, in factcould take to 
make the situation better. We should be developing and deploying renewable 
energy as fast as possible, with a wartime mentality in terms of priority and 
commitment. And we should be planning for the end of growth, indeed for 
economic contraction. These things will be difficult, there's no getting 
around it. Still, they are possible in principle. But we will fail for sure if 
we remain sunk in denial and do not even make the effort.

China's economic bubble in some ways represents a microcosm of the entire 
industrial perioditself a relatively brief era of urbanization, fossil-fueled 
expansion, technological innovation, and unprecedented explosion of 
consumption. China has taken only two or three decades to accomplish what some 
other nations did over the course of a couple of centuries. This suggests 
that, for that country, implosion may come just as quickly.

It is all a remarkable spectacle. Sit back, watch, and marvel if you wish. 
But know one thing: unless we collectively wake up, engage the brakes on this 
runaway train (and here I am speaking not just of China), and start discussing
how we will adjust to the end of economic growth as we have known and defined 
it,
 none of this will end well.


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